Interviews > Tony Wayne
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What important lessons did you learn in your early tours?
My first tour was unique for an FSO in that it was in Washington DC with INR, working on China when Mao Tse Tung died. They needed a China watcher, and it was a great first posting. I started to learn to navigate the bureaucracy, and importantly, how to draft like an FSO, not a grad student. That included putting the main points up front, and to be concise and as clear as possible even when explaining the details. INR was known at the time for its good analysis, and Kissinger actually read their daily products.
Other writing tips?
I came away from my many assignments, including two years selecting cables to read for the Secretary of State, with four conclusions for cables from the field. First, the title is very important. It must grab a busy reader’s attention and get her or him to pull it out of the pack. Second, the summary must be punchy and capture interest. It should have the bottom-line up front. Next in importance is the conclusion/comment: it should have something insightful to say. Finally, if you get all of those done well, the reader may well read your reporting and analysis that makes up the bulk of the cable. Catchy examples and quotes help make that more interesting.
When writing for senior officials at state it is very important to be succinct and “useful” for your readers. Ask how can I help busy people get insights they can use from my piece?
What did you learn from your colleagues?
As noted, my superiors in INR really taught me how to be much clearer in my analysis and to write succinctly. My first assignment abroad was to Morocco as a political officer. Fortunately, my bosses gave me a lot of room to operate. My fellow junior officers did a kind of self-mentoring. We organized activities and outreach for ourselves. My bosses were quite happy to have us out meeting people whom they didn’t have time to meet, and the DCM encouraged this by establishing a special slot on the country team for the “junior officers.” While many of these interlocutors we pursued weren’t very “important” in the strict sense because they were up and coming, they gave us, and thus the embassy, a much deeper understanding of regular people, the country, and its culture. By the end of my tour, I knew many more younger politicians and students, including anti-regime youth, so that other embassy officials asked to be introduced to them, and I had started to learn the vital role of networking for a Foreign Service officer. I have some of my fondest memories from that tour.
What can one learn from a staffing position?
I think every FSO should have at least one tour as a staff assistant. “The building” is a very complex place. It is often frustrating, and if you don’t know how it works, it’ll be more frustrating. Once you have some good knowledge of how “the building” works, you have a better chance to influence outcomes. That makes you useful and allows you to get things done, no matter what your rank. Staffing the Secretary or a senior principal also gives you an opportunity to learn from top leaders every day, by watching how they work and by asking them questions. Ambassadors Arnie Raphel, L. Paul (Jerry) Bremmer, Ray Seitz, Larry Eagleburger and Richard (Dick) Holbrooke all taught me, directly or indirectly, when I was “staffing” them and others. I was also very fortunate to “grow up” in the Service working with some of the very best officers of my generation and learned much from them.
Who was your best coach or mentor and what did you learn from that individual?
I’ve had many great mentors and coaches, but I’ll mention Adrian Basora, our last Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. He was my boss in the Political Section in Paris. Adrian was very methodical and committed to improving performance. He would share what he was reading and learning with this team. For example, I distinctly remember he read a book called The One-Minute Manager and was excited to explain the core ideas to us. So, I read it, and it had some great points. But more importantly, he demonstrated enthusiasm for self-teaching and constant learning that I took to heart. Also, he was also both caring and business-like. He showed you could have both qualities. Later on, Adrian recruited me to work at the National Security Council, which opened my eyes to how the White House worked and to the need for me to learn about international economics.
Your career is notable for having taken three excursions outside of the department. What is the value of that?
All FSOs should look for at least one or possibly two opportunities to get outside of State for another experience that has a link to international affairs. It will enrich your career and make you and the Department stronger.
I first spent a year at Harvard’s Kennedy School. That offered a number of super learning opportunities. For example, I took a class on negotiations offered at the School of Education and gained an excellent perspective on how we do international negotiations. Even though many of the class examples were related to labor negotiation, I applied the lessons later to diplomatic negotiations. The main reason I sought to go to the one-year master’s program at Harvard was to learn more about leadership and bureaucratic politics. I had seen terrible infighting at the top of the Reagan Administration and wanted to know how to better handle such conflict and to exhibit leadership in such situations. I found wonderful courses that served me very well in the rest of my career. It was perfect timing as I was ready to learn about those topics after working for about seven years at State. I would not have been so eager to explore leadership had I not just lived through two very difficult years on the seventh floor of the state department. One of the key lessons I took away from the leadership classes is that being a leader does not depend on one’s rank. Rather it depends on whether you can help your group overcome an important problem it faces. If you can help lead a group to solve a problem, you are a leader. I have tried to practice that insight since I learned it and have tried to share it with others.
Later, I took a two-year leave of absence from the Service to write as a national security correspondent in Washington for the Christian Science Monitor. I gained a much deeper understanding of how foreign policy is made in Washington. Taking off my State Department hat, I got to interact with other important actors in forging U.S. foreign policy: people on Capitol Hill, lobbyists, foreign leaders and the media. Getting outside of the Department and looking in helped me see our institution in context of a very dynamic capital city and made me a stronger policy maker and diplomat in subsequent years.
Finally, I had the great honor of working for two years at the National Security Council at the end of the George Bush Administration and the beginning of Bill Clinton Administration. I learned so much. It was an amazing opportunity to see leaders interacting, to help shape their conversations and decisions and to help guide the interagency process to important outcomes, such as the agreement on agricultural trade between the US and Europe which opened the door for a Uruguay Round trade agreement (still in effect today). It was exhausting but tremendously educational.
I’m a very strong supporter of a mid-career learning break.
What did you learn working on trade and economic issues?
If you’re politically coned, like I was, or any other cone, you have to know about economics—you have to understand international business and the economic tools that the United States has as vital tools of our diplomacy. Many other nations and governments have economic interaction with the U.S. as a top priority, and the biggest positive contribution the U.S. can make to others is often via economic actions and levers.
I began to learn these lessons in the 90s working on Europe. I went to the NSC thinking I'd manage bilateral relations with Western European countries and was really surprised that my first assignment was related to trade—I needed to get the US and Europe to agree on the GATT negotiations. I had no experience working on trade. So, I set out to educate myself by interacting with colleagues from USTR, Agriculture and Treasury as well as at the NSC. I came to see how important economic issues are for us and for our partnerships in the world. All diplomats should make sure to learn the basics of international economics—you don’t need a PhD, but you need to understand the fundamentals and be conversant in the key issues.
We diplomats should work closely with U.S. businesses and see business leaders as potential partners where we serve. That does not mean, we should do without question all they may seek, but a good partnership can be win-win, including for the host country. At the very least, U.S. diplomats should know enough about trade and economics to understand what is important and not important, and what fits is well in the U.S.’s broader interests. Often, we will be called on to jointly advocate for U.S. interests together with the private sector. And, often, the private sector in another country can be partners in bringing about valuable reforms that serve broader U.S. interests.
I remember a key “ah, hah” moment when I had just recently arrived to be the DCM at what became the US Mission to the European Union. A representative of a big U.S. firm told the Ambassador and me that if we succeeded in changing one European Commission regulation, it would mean over 200 million dollars more for U.S. businesses. I then understood why what could seem to be non-sexy issues, could have major importance and was worth my time and effort. I then worked earnestly on the path which led me to become EB Assistant Secretary and to spend six more years learning and practicing more economic diplomacy.
Could you outline some of your principles of negotiation?
One of the most important things to keep in mind is understanding what your objectives and negotiating room are and what your counterpart’s objectives and room to maneuver are. It is important that you can understand what the persons on the other side of the table are seeking to achieve and what limits they face in their flexibility. It helps me to think of Venn diagrams: determine where U.S. interests intersect with our counterparts’ interests. Then, you can set out to move toward that overlapping space. If there is no overlap, you may have to create it using the tools you have available. In the most extreme cases, that may even be by using military force.
When I was working as a DAS in EUR, for example, I saw that in what Richard Holbrooke did in getting Serbia to the bargaining table over the fighting in the Balkans, for example. He did not find an overlap of interests with the Serbs, so he worked to change the Venn diagram with tough diplomatic tactics and calling on NATO military might, so eventually Serb interests overlapped more with ours. A similar thing subsequently happened in the Kosovo conflict when NATO bombing helped to create space in which our negotiators could start negotiations and end the fighting in Kosovo.
Now, of course, one is not always able to call on military tools to fix a situation and happily most of the time, one does not need to do so. For example, after the fighting had stopped in Kosovo, we still needed to negotiate a framework to get the region headed toward peace and prosperity. I was playing a role engaging in a serious negotiation first with the G-8 countries and then with a broader group of several score countries and organizations to craft a regional agreement that would serve as a framework for peace and prosperity. Russia was resisting each step of the way and the other G-7 countries were hesitant to push them too hard. I noted, however, that the Central and Eastern European countries and several smaller partners like the Dutch were willing to press for ambitious outcomes over Russian objections. Then, my colleagues and I worked those countries as partners within the broader process to make it much harder for the other large allies or for the Russians to resist. At the same time, we worked quietly with the Russians to give them a way forward. This combination of increased pressure and showing a willingness to craft a face-saving way ahead for all changed the dynamic. Working directly with my Russian counterpart in a key two-day negotiating session, we built enough trust to narrow the gap to one issue and then relied on the ministers to finalize a deal (because neither of us had enough authority to yield on the final point). It held, though we had a few more mini crises to work through on the day of the Summit when leaders would bless the agreement.
This experience brought home to me the importance of finding partners and building alliances during negotiations. When at the negotiating table, it is important to have support lined up, especially if one side is trying to block progress. In multilateral settings, you can encourage partners to speak up and change the dynamic, so it appears that all parties are moving in the same direction. To engineer this, you must know build a trusting relationship with your partners, have fluid communications with them, know as well as possible your adversaries, understanding their interests, and show creativity and flexibility while keeping your ends clearly in mind. When negotiating with friends or rivals, I have always found it important to try to avoid emotional confrontations during talks, to diffuse them if they emerge, and to keep people talking by doing one’s best to look for ways forward—finding the overlapping in Venn diagrams. To get there, you often need to get creative.
Leading in Afghanistan, Argentina, and Mexico—where the U.S. presence can be outsized, polarizing—what lessons do you have on public diplomacy?
When I started as Ambassador in Argentina, the country had the highest level of anti-Americanism in Latin America. In thinking through what to do with my embassy team, we settled on using all of the tools we could muster to demonstrate that Americans and Argentines had much in common and that we could work together for the good of both countries. This meant that we needed to identify promising areas for action and use as effectively as possible our public diplomacy and media outreach tools. We supported NGOs who were fighting trafficking in persons and women abused by spouses, for example, pressing for action to support their laudable goals. We aligned ourselves visibly with positive efforts in education or exchanges. We offered support to fight drug traffickers. We championed freedom of the press. We looked for innovative ways to use the arts and music to build bridges. For example, it turned out that American rock ’n' roll was extremely popular in Argentina. We partnered with U.S, and Argentine artists to signal to young Argentines that our two cultures had much in common. The basic lesson we learned was that everyone in the Embassy had to think of themselves as public diplomacy officers and seek ways to accentuate the positive parts of our relationship and the good that America had to offer. It proved to be a winning formula.
In subsequent assignments, I sought to pursue the same strategy. At times, I got push-back from public diplomacy officers. In Mexico, for example, some resisted shifting focus to Facebook for social media messaging. I noted that there were 50 million Mexicans on Facebook when I arrived as Ambassador, and the Embassy had only 10,000 followers. That was an audience waiting to hear from us. Mission Mexico grew its social media presence to just under a million Facebook followers in four years. Most every part of the Embassy and the consulates contributed to the broad outreach effort. We publicized INL graduations and seminars and support for Amber Alert programs, assistance to Mexico’s plant health services, education and music exchanges, built a wide network of partnerships and did much more in order to show the good aspects of U.S.-Mexico relations. The positive responses generated by these programs demonstrated the tremendous value of public diplomacy done well.
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