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Interviews > Richard Hoagland

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You became well-known in the Department for your writing skills and style. What advice would you give to aspiring reporting officers? 

First, work hard to figure out how what you hear in meetings and what you pick up at social events (especially when the wine is flowing and people are a bit less reserved in what they say) fits into the larger story we at the embassies are trying to tell Washington about the country where we are serving. Every cable should tell a story. Second, volunteer reporting; don’t passively wait for it to be assigned to you.  

You’ve said that in your experience as an Ambassador, public diplomacy officers often didn’t see themselves as reporting officers. How can we help to change that belief and behavior? How can PD officers become reporting officers? 

Public diplomacy officers are reporting officers. In fact, they often have better access to certain segments of host country populations than political and economic officers. In my view, they are an essential part of an embassy’s overall reporting. The Ambassador should recognize this, and even require their PD officers to be reporting officers. But if PD officers want to do more reporting and they don’t have the support of the Ambassador or DCM, they can volunteer to draft segments or portions of a front-channel cable. Send a draft to the Political chief or DCM. Just go for it. Take the initiative!  

It is also important to read all of the reporting coming out of the Embassy, from all sections. That provides context and depth for future reporting, and helps identify broader themes or issues for the Embassy to pursue. This reluctance on the part of PD officers to be reporting officers stems in part from the unification of USIA with the State Department in 1999. The differences between the missions and “corporate culture” of the two organizations have proven remarkably persistent over time. 

You have served as press spokesman in Moscow and Director for Public Diplomacy in South Asia.  What lessons should Foreign Service Officers learn about dealing with the media and speaking to the press? 

Too many FSOs keep their distance from reporters. I loved working with reporters! Early on, I learned how to separate the wheat from the chaff, meaning I could determine which reporters were really good and were also trustworthy. The truly good reporters are a goldmine for reporting officers. As I built relationships of trust with the best reporters, I practiced what I call, “give a little to get a lot.” What I mean by that is you can carefully use your own judgment to spin a story toward accuracy if you sometimes pass along bits of information that might veer closely toward the category of CLASSIFIED. And you do this as a conversation.  

For example, you might say, “Actually, there’s a slightly different version of that,” and you pass along your nugget. But you don’t stop there. You immediately follow up with, “But tell me what you’ve heard about that.” And then you draw out the reporter for information you can use in your own diplomatic reporting. Most people love talking about what they know. 

Could you expand on your answer to “best boss”? Not everyone gets an opportunity to work for Tom Pickering!  What other lessons did you learn from him?  Who were some of your other mentors and what did they teach you? 

Actually, I worked for Ambassador Pickering a relatively short time before he was called back to the State Department to become the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. There is one thing, however, that happened on his watch that I remember well. Vanity Fair arranged an interview with his then-wife, Alice, and, as Information Officer, I accompanied the journalist to Spaso House for the interview. Her reply to his first question was, let’s say, something I thought should definitely not appear in print, but I didn’t bat an eyelash at that moment. As I walked the journalist out of Spaso House, I said to him, “You know, you can’t use that first Q & A.” He replied, “I know. I’d love to print it, but I won’t.” And he kept his word. 

My other memorable mentors were Ambassador Lynn Pascoe and Ambassador Beth Jones, both when I worked for them in Washington. They set the highest possible professional standards. They trusted their teams. They never micromanaged, but they always knew what was going on. And they provided superb guidance. 

How can Foreign Service Officers work effectively with colleagues from the intelligence community? 

It’s like everything else in life. Build relationships of trust. If you’ve arrived for an assignment in Washington, don’t just hunker down in your own cubicle. Make appointments early on to visit the other relevant agencies so that you become known to them and so that you know who your counterparts are as real people, not just names on an email. After all, that’s the core of any diplomacy, whether here or abroad—building relationships. Specifically about the intelligence community—remember that these are terrific colleagues. They aren’t adversaries in any way. They are wholly complementary to what we do. They are an essential part of the team. 

You can and should work in parallel with them, you should read their products, and understand what they do and how they do it. But you have to be able to maintain a clear separation of roles and responsibilities with your colleagues from the IC. Be smart about it. You should know and navigate those lanes, but don’t be afraid to build relationships with your colleagues. Fifty percent of diplomacy is with external partners—but the other 50 percent is internal, with Embassy colleagues and Washington officials. 

One way that we were able to benefit from the expertise and insights of other agency representatives was through ad hoc working groups at the Embassy. Those round table discussions, when focused on specific, cross-cutting foreign policy issues, can be quite useful. 

In this day and age, so much policy work is done via phone and email. An Assistant Secretary can essentially convene a virtual PCC by starting an email chain with senior counterparts from DoD, USAID, and the NSC. So how important is traditional, front-channel reporting to policy advocacy? 

We might be stuck in the past a little bit, but cables are still important. No, they’re not as easy, convenient, or quick as an email, but they provide depth, context, and thoughtful analysis. Further, they are still considered the “official record.” And they do help to inform policy decisions. Often in the field, you sometimes don’t know exactly what Washington leaders are looking for, so your reports might add new information or perspective that helps them make better decisions. 

If there is a crisis or an emergency at Post, when and how should you let Washington know? When should you sound the alarm? 

One of the golden rules is never to surprise your bosses. So you should communicate with Washington via email or a quick phone call, just to give them a heads up about the situation. Don’t try to handle the situation yourself. Some first-time Ambassadors can feel like they have all the information and authority they need to solve a problem, and they want to do it all themselves, without Washington’s guidance or interference. That can put an FSO in a really tight spot.  

There can also be unintended consequences of informing Washington about everything. I was once instructed to report to the 7th Floor in real time about any developments with a certain issue. When I did so, I was later interviewed by DS agents who wanted to know the particulars. So you have to careful and use good judgment, even when following orders.

How did you choose to spend the majority of your career in the Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs? Did you have a strategy or long-term plan when bidding on assignments? 

Quite often, my assignments were accidental. One thing just seemed to lead to another. In fact, very seldom did I bid on a job. I was often recruited and told where to go. Early on, for example, I was supposed to go to Chad, but then I was tapped for a special project supporting the Afghanistan Media Resource Center during the Soviet-Afghan war. That was supposed to last just a couple of weeks, but ended up lasting a full year. That led to me being recruited for an assignment in Peshewar, and then that led to a job as the deputy coordinator for Afghanistan.  

I do think it is a good rule of thumb to have experience in at least two different geographic bureaus, to provide depth and breadth to one’s career. In my case, after several assignments dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan, I wanted to avoid being typecast. That was just when the Soviet Union was breaking up, so I jumped at the chance to serve in Russia and Central Asia. In fact, I had an assignment as PAO in Geneva, but the Department broke that assignment to send me as the first full-time PAO to Tashkent. I’ve always preferred serving in the more challenging posts. I’ve always been happy going to difficult places. 

What skills or approaches were most useful in your work in transitioning countries like Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan?  How was that different from other postings? 

During my career, I served only in Pakistan (three times) and in former Soviet Socialist Republics—Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. At the beginning of their independence (and sometimes even to this day), we went about building relations with them in the wrong way, probably because we knew so little about them. I well remember our initial “irrational exuberance” that these new countries were surely yearning to breathe free and would naturally become free-market democracies, with just a bit of guidance from us. No!  

Their histories and their ways of seeing the world and governing were and are radically different from the Western model that was built over centuries based on the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. Even to this day, our diplomacy still has too much public finger-wagging and naming-and-shaming. From the very beginning of my career, I have been a firm adherent of realpolitik. But official Washington? Not so much. 

How can diplomats abroad effectively advocate for U.S. foreign policy and values when people at home are protesting official actions that appear to undermine those values? 

You can be an effective advocate for the United States, our policies, and our values—without wagging your finger at foreign countries and telling them how to behave. When I used to deliver controversial demarches—on anti-corruption, or human rights, for example—I would preface the talking points with a personal anecdote, to make it more real and relevant to the relationship. I would explain the idea behind the talking points, why it matters, and why it’s in our mutual interests for the host government to do something about it. You can’t simply impose your values on others. You need to find a way to convey those points and deliver that message in a respectful manner so that it is received and understood by others. And quite frankly, when it’s done behind closed doors rather than in a press statement, you’re more likely to get a positive result. 

What advice would you give someone who is considering joining the Foreign Service? What skills are most important to develop? 

I’d boil this down to read, read, read. Read as extensively as you can international news and reporting so that you begin to understand what’s really going on in the world. I know that a number of our young officers come to State with degrees in diplomacy and international affairs. That’s certainly fine but not required. One of the great beauties of the Foreign Service is that it accepts new officers from many, many different backgrounds. Also, if you have a chance to live in another culture before you join the Foreign Service, do so! You’d be surprised how many former and current ambassadors started their international careers with a stint in the Peace Corps. 

What would you say is the most important attribute of a successful DCM? 

This one is easy and it can be answered in two words: mind meld. From day one, DCMs should observe their ambassadors closely and, to the extent possible (and responsible), adopt their style of leadership and way of thinking. I hasten to add that I recommend this when working with professional ambassadors. I admit this might be more tricky for political appointees.   

Lots of Ambassadors (yourself included) have said they wish they had dealt more quickly/decisively with a poor performer. Why is this so hard? What can we do to get it right and be more decisive? 

This is a hard one because I think most diplomats are congenitally compromisers and peace makers. We shy away from conflict, maybe hoping it will go away on its own, or we try to work around it. Bad behavior can be one off, but more often it doesn’t really go away. The only thing I can suggest is that if you do need to rein in another officer on your team, be sure you have in advance the support of your boss. Make it a team effort. 

Could you tell us what the key was to your successful negotiation of the air base agreements in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan?  What lessons are there for us for future negotiations? 

Those were actually one-off experiences. Why? Because Moscow had already told those countries to accommodate the United States’ desire for temporary military bases in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And so, fundamentally they had their marching orders for what we needed to achieve. The negotiations themselves were the fairly normal exercise of bracketed language and finding the exact words that both sides could live with. What was unusual, however, was that we had to get it done within days rather than the months and months that normally go into negotiating bilateral agreements. 

How will the coronavirus pandemic affect the way we conduct diplomacy? 

I don’t think it will radically change the diplomatic profession or the practice of diplomacy. Zoom cannot replace the value of face-to-face interactions. Yes, it’s possible to have virtual conferences and events, but they lack something important. You can’t read the body language of the speaker or the audience. You can’t have a side conversation with your neighbor or a contact. You can’t connect and talk about family, hobbies, vacations, over Zoom. The people-to-people contact is so valuable and so important. I also don’t see how you can do complicated diplomatic negotiations such as a budget deal or Brexit over Zoom. Ultimately, this must be done in person.

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