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Tradecraft > Diplomatic Tradecraft

Jim Jeffrey

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What are the keys to developing diplomatic strategies? 

Know the mission assigned and where it fits into the bigger picture. 

Assemble and weigh options based on the above and a rigorous objective review of facts pertaining to the issue. 

Choose the option to support and convince one’s outside environment / taskers / bosses of its wisdom. 

Devise a coordinated execution plan with specific taskings, belly buttons to take action, timelines, reporting chain, and clearances from all impacted. (Here 4. not only needs to be developed in parallel with 2. and 3. but in many cases a proper execution of 4. will be germaine or even decisive in the choice of the option in 3. ie from military: “a good plan violently executed better than a perfect plan poorly executed; in diplomatic parlance we can replace “violently” with “timely” and “poorly” with “belatedly”) 

We are good at coercive diplomacy—sanctions and other tools to include military force—how can we avoid over reliance on these tools?

First by changing the question. Assumption in it is that coercive diplomacy is “bad” or, more subtly, “to be avoided” as it is executed by other agencies eg DOD or Treasury.) 

Then, we need diplomatic tradecraft that is able to assess the tools available to respond to/resolve issues and weigh relative costs/benefits of using those tools including cost of tool versus benefit of result employed by using it. (That calculus led Baker and to some degree Powell to reject the hard power tool of offensive military action in the Gulf War—but because they overestimated costs of that tool and overestimated as well the effectiveness of non-kinetic options they were wrong. Conclusion: this is inherently hard stuff.)

How do you support and ultimately shape policy you don’t agree with?

Simple—just like policy you do agree with. Decision points rather are whether (1) you see the policy not just as wrong but illegal, catastrophic or immoral; and (2) your leaving could trigger a revision or at least reassessment or, conversely, your staying will do you permanent moral legal or professional harm.

What techniques work to encourage multiple agencies to work together rather than against each other? How do these techniques differ when working at the NSC, at post or in the department?

Most importantly but most rare—(1) an authority that all players are subordinate to and listen to who dictates who will do what with whom, including who is in the lead. Absent that, (2) institutional constraints and procedures that automatically or by SOP set out authorities, pecking order, responsibility. Chief of Mission authority or in military, command authority and “supporting command-supported command” construct relevant here. (3) Third choice—long term personal relations and similar world views that smooth disputes and tend to nudge people into collective decisions. Jesuits, FSOs and SOF all examples. (4) Fourth choice: anarchy tamed by a “talent” regardless of official position taking control through a Darwinian struggle. (Richard Holbrooke dominated not just the US but the entire international community’s Balkan policy from the unlikely perch of an Assistant Secretary). (5) Fifth choice: anarchy leading to (a) system failure or (b) one of the first four above.

Where one sits per above question determines often which of five above one defaults to. At NSC if the system is working its (1) or sometimes collective leadership a la (2) under NSC procedures. At a post it’s strongly (2) given strength and clarity of COM position. In the Department it’s a struggle between (3), (4), and (5) assuming that (1) is absent, and given in the Department the weakness of (2). This leads Secretaries frequently to combine (1) and (4) with a “special envoy” for a key foreign policy issue-either an official such envoy or double hatting someone.

What is the most important trait that makes one an effective officer—at the action officer level and the DAS/Amb level? What should we do to hone this trait?

No single one but also not the huge variety EER drafting requires. Only three real core traits—motivation, integrity and judgment. (Other traits while not unimportant if not inherently present can be “grown” by someone with above three ie if an individual lacks interpersonal skills, judgment will signal that fault, motivation will require it be dealt with, judgment again provides a solution(s) and integrity gives the ability to objectively assess success of solution.) 

The three apply at all levels. But the higher up one goes the more each is stressed. Motivation beyond a certain point given ever greater competition and ever less benefits “delta” at higher levels requires ambition—which can run afoul of integrity. Judgment must be broader, more flexible, faster, simply better to deal with the far more intractable problems faced on “the heights” (easy problems are/should be dealt with at lower levels). Finally Integrity is more challenged internally (demands of ambition) and externally (ever more amoral world of higher level decision making). Of the three, JUDGEMENT is the trait that must develop most with advancement.

Lots of smart people, lots of hardworking people, how do you teach and develop good judgment?

Always—effective and transparent—also in the sense of broadly visible—rewards and penalties feedback. Next, Extreme tolerance of lower level initiative even if results questionable, coupled with caution sanctioning individual initiative even when results are unacceptable absent some sort of horrific, immoral or illegal result that can’t be ignored or—very important—a pattern of “wrong calls” from someone using his/her initiative.

Finally—force the system to develop, constantly improve and reward mentoring—treat professionals in a “top down” “leaders do the institution’s key bottom line work” setting (research institutes, law firms, diplomacy) as journeymen or apprentices—legal profession institutionalized this best with law clerk system—for most or all of their careers until (some) selected for the highest levels.

Everyone lauds bosses who delegate—what can we do to elicit trust and get bosses to delegate to us?

First, be successful and ensure the boss is aware of that success. 

Second, keep bosses informed in advance (enough in advance to allow their intervention), spare them mindless detail or constant vying for attention, and have the judgment to know the difference between the two. 

Third, Rigorously discipline oneself to control impulses from integrity lapses to improper management of staff that will sour bosses on you even in the presence of the next two above.

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